Maritime Compliance Report
TWIC Changes
However, one of the main purposes of a TWIC is to run the applicant through the terrorist watch list to see if they have any links to terrorist organizations or terrorist activities. Some feel that this is unnecessary and that it criminalizes mariners. The truth is that in the past terrorists have blown up passenger ferries in the Philippines, resulting in many lives lost. So what's that got to do with the U.S.? It is a viable threat scenario here as well. Also, according to the FBI's joint "Operation Drydock," with the Coast Guard in 2004 nine credentialed mariners were found to have "possible associations to terrorism." How bad would it be if a vessel was used in a terrorist attack, and it was later found that the captain was a terrorist and that it could have been prevented if anyone had bothered to check? I don't think TWICs are useless.
So why is it OK now if some credentialed mariners don't have TWICs? The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 is counter-terrorism legislation which requires the prevention or deterrence of a transportation security incident (TSI). A "TSI" is defined as a security incident resulting in significant loss of life, environmental damage, transportation system disruption, or economic disruption in a particular area. The Coast Guard, in establishing the applicability of the security regulations, determined some vessels to be at a low risk of being involved in a TSI, and excluded them from the applicability. It is those vessels, which are at low risk of a TSI and have no security plan, which will be allowed to have captains without TWICs. Whether you agree with this or not, one good thing which I hope may come from it is it may help us refocus on the intent of the security regulations, which is to prevent or deter a transportation security incident (TSI), and to avoid the complacency of, to borrow a phrase, "security theater."
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